On the spending side, Biden’s 2022 Inflation Reduction Act (IRA), which included the largest investment in climate and energy in US history, will, if allowed to proceed unchecked, end up costing almost $1 trillion or three times the initial estimate. Trump is, of course, far less interested in green energy subsidies so if he wins, we could see subsidies curtailed in both the time period over which they are offered and the breadth of green energy sources that receive them. Electric-vehicle tax credits are also likely to be on the chopping block. With 71% of projects announced under the IRA still in the planning stage, it’s conceivable that some will be cancelled or delayed until election clarity emerges. Industrial company and green company earnings in the US have received a large boost from these subsidies, and could still see a strong path ahead under a second Biden administration. However, the runway for subsidies and the breadth of earnings lift could be curtailed under a change in administration.
In terms of other significant spending proposals, Trump has expressed an interest in offering stimulus checks to people, although there are few details about the focus or scale of the plan at this stage. As noted earlier, Biden is likely to support higher spending in areas such as education, housing, and climate.
Overall, the two candidates’ stances on taxes and their potentially unsustainable spending plans could add $1–$5 trillion to the deficit and raise the risk of higher interest rates.
Regulatory policy — While fiscal and tax policy depend on both Congress and the president, the latter has a much bigger say on regulation. For instance, under Biden, we have seen higher capital requirements for banks, more scrutiny on drug prices, and tougher EPA emissions standards. Trump would be more likely to deregulate industries and reduce what he considers onerous requirements on businesses. (For some context on the cost of doing business in the US, the National Association of Manufacturers recently estimated that the cost of federal regulation for US businesses is more than $3 trillion, or an average of $277,000 per firm annually—an especially heavy burden for small firms.)2 Trump would also like to bring independent regulatory agencies, such as the Federal Communications Commission and the Federal Trade Commission, under presidential authority. These shifts would have a notable impact on regulated sectors of the economy.
To offer one example of an in area in which Trump might cut regulatory red tape after taking office, he could reasonably be expected to modify or repeal the EPA’s planned 2027 emissions upgrade. With changes such as this (and the possible green-energy spending changes noted earlier), a Trump administration would slow the pace of the country’s green-energy transition and maintain a somewhat greater reliance on fossil fuels.
Immigration — From an economic standpoint, this is another underappreciated election issue. The cost of dealing with undocumented immigrants is admittedly a challenge for border states, and in some polls, immigration is now the number one issue, surpassing inflation. But the ongoing surge in immigration—which will add some seven million people to the US population by 2026, according to the latest estimates from the Congressional Budget Office—has provided a positive supply-side shock for the economy that has helped reduce wage pressure and contributed to better balance in the labor market. While many immigrants being counted in the labor force today are legal, thanks to a catch-up in the visa backlog, the surge in undocumented immigrants has been a factor. Trump has vowed to enforce border control more effectively, but has also promised to deport undocumented workers, which would be a significant negative labor supply shock and would be inflationary.
Trade initiatives — If Trump wins the election, it’s widely expected he’ll raise tariffs, perhaps by as much as 10% across the board and as much as 60% for imports from China. Estimates suggest that a universal baseline tariff could raise $1 trillion over 10 years, which would help fund some of Trump’s tax plans. On the other hand, higher tariffs could add to inflationary pressure and hurt consumer purchasing power.
In other areas of trade, Trump could use the joint review of the US-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) scheduled for 2026 to implement shifts in policy relating to Mexico. Relationships with Europe and Japan are also likely to be less cordial than under a Biden administration.
If Biden is reelected, trade policy will likely continue on its current path, with decoupling from China remaining a priority but Europe and Japan considered strong allies.
Geopolitics — The reshaping of the geopolitical map is a given should Trump return to power. Withdrawal from NATO and an increase in defense spending by Europe, the US, and possibly Japan are all potential spillovers. Energy security would be an important policy pillar for a Biden or Trump administration, but would manifest itself differently, from large green-energy subsidies and curbs on natural-gas exports under Biden to higher fossil-fuel production and exports under Trump. Decoupling from China would remain an imperative in either election scenario, but Trump prefers tariffs to subsidies, so the substance of US industrial policy would shift accordingly.